















This paper analyzes the effects of financial market globalization on the cross-country 
pattern of development in the world economy.  To this end, it develops a dynamic 
macroeconomic model of imperfect credit markets, in which the investment becomes 
borrowing-constrained at the lower stage of development.  In the absence of the 
international financial market, the world economy converges to the symmetric steady 
state, and the cross-country difference disappears in the long run. In the presence of the 
international financial market, the symmetric steady state could lose its stability, in which 
case the cross-country distribution of the capital stocks is concentrated into two mass 
points in every stable steady state.  The symmetry-breaking caused by unrestricted 
flows of financial capital leads to a polarization of the world economy into the rich and 
the poor.  The model thus demonstrates the possibility that financial market globalization 
may cause, or at least magnify, inequality of nations, and the international financial 
market is a mechanism through which some countries become rich at the expense of 
others. The model suggests that t he poor countries cannot jointly escape from the 
poverty trap by merely cutting their links to rich countries.  Nor would foreign aids to 
the poor eliminate the inequalities; as in a game of musical chairs, some countries must 
be excluded from being rich. 
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(Economic Growth of Open Economies), O11 (Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic 
Development) 
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1. Introduction 
  The role of the international financial market in economic development is one of the most 
controversial issues in macroeconomics.  The standard, neoclassical view suggests that an integration of 
financial markets leads to the efficient allocation of the world saving by facilitating the flows of financial 
capital from rich to poor countries.  This accelerates economic development in poor countries.  Without 
borrowing from abroad, poor countries would have to finance their investment entirely by the domestic 
saving, which would slow down their development.  According to this view, financial market 
globalization is an equalizing force, which will bring about a greater, faster convergence of economic 
performances across countries.   
  As many have pointed out, however, even casual observations seem to refute this standard, 
textbook view.  In reality, many poor countries receive little private credit from abroad.
2  They are 
indeed more concerned that the access to the international financial market might lead to an outflow of 
domestic funds, and continue to impose restrictions in their efforts to channel more domestic saving into 
domestic investment.   These restrictive policies did not seem to prevent some former developing 
countries, such as Korea and Taiwan, from achieving rapid growth; some even argue that these policies 
were essential elements of their successful development strategies.  Furthermore, a greater integration of 
financial markets after the W.W.II seems to have done little to reduce the cross-country difference in 
per capita income in the world economy.  On the contrary, the evidence, reported by Quah (1993, 
1997) and others, suggests that the world economy is increasingly polarized into the rich and the poor. 
  There is indeed the popular view that the international financial market magnifies the gap 
between the rich and the poor.  According to this view, financial market globalization is an unequalizing 
force.  The believers of this view often advocate that poor countries should impose more controls to 
stem the outflows of the domestic saving and that official aids from rich countries are needed for the 
development of poor countries.   Some even hold a radical view that the World Bank and the IMF, 
which promote financial market globalization, are agents of the global corporate capitalism that exploits 
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developing countries.  These radical economists often suggest that the poor countries should jointly cut 
their links to the rich countries and unite among themselves to escape the poverty. 
The standard neoclassical framework is simply inadequate to deal with these issues.  What is 
needed is an alternative theoretical framework, which is consistent with the lack of the private financial 
capital flows from the rich to the poor, and allows for the possibility that the international financial 
market may be as a cause of the inequalities of nations.  Only within such a framework could one 
examine the validity of policy proposals offered by the radical economists. 
To this end, this paper proposes a dynamic macroeconomic model with imperfect credit 
markets.  The imperfection arises due to potential defaults by the borrowers (and imperfect sanction 
against them).  Due to the imperfection, the borrowers need to have enough wealth to start the project, 
which makes the domestic investment be borrowing-constrained at the lower stage of development.  
The model is examined in three different environments: i) the autarky; ii) the small open economy that 
faces the exogenously given world interest rate; and iii) the world economy consisting of a continuum of 
inherently identical economies. 
  In autarky, the dynamics of capital formation is shown to be independent of the imperfection, 
and the economy reaches to the unique steady state in the long run.  Even though the borrowing 
constraint is binding at the lower stage of development, the effect is entirely offset by the lower interest 
rate.  In the small economy case, without offsetting changes in the interest rate, the borrowing constraint 
at the lower stage of development has the effect of reducing the investment, thereby slowing down the 
development process.  Under some conditions, this effect is strong enough to generate multiple steady 
states in the dynamics of capital formation, which suggests the possibility of a poverty trap.  It is also 
shown how even a small, temporary change in the (exogenous) world interest rate could have significant 
permanent effects. 
  Having examined the autarky and small open economy cases, the paper turns to the analysis of 
the world economy.  Without the international financial market, the world economy is simply a collection 
of autarky economies, and hence converges to the unique symmetric steady state, in which all the 
countries have the same level of the capital stock.  In other words, the cross-country difference will Endogenous Inequality, 7/20/00, 8:46 AM 
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disappear in the long run.  In the presence of the international financial market, however, the world 
economy is a collection of small open economies (with the interest rate being endogenously determined 
in the international financial market).  Under some conditions, the symmetric steady state loses its 
stability, and the cross-country distribution of the capital stock is concentrated into two mass points in 
every stable steady state. The symmetry-breaking caused by unrestricted flows of financial capital thus 
leads to a polarization of the world economy into the rich and the poor. In any stable steady state, the 
rich countries are richer and the poor countries are poorer than in the autarky steady state.  Therefore, 
the model demonstrates not only the possibility that financial market globalization may cause or at least 
magnify inequality of nations, but also offers a theoretical justification for the view that the international 
financial market is a mechanism through which some countries become rich at the expense of others.  At 
the same time, the model suggests that poor countries cannot jointly escape from the poverty trap by 
merely cutting their links to rich countries and that official aids from the rich would not eliminate the 
inequalities.  Just as in a game of musical chairs, some countries must be excluded from being rich. 
It should also be emphasized that financial market globalization does not necessarily lead to the 
symmetry-breaking and the polarization.  Under different conditions, the model predicts the 
convergence, even though the speed of convergence may be smaller in the presence of the international 
financial market.  One major advantage of the present model is that it is capable of generating the two 
alternative scenarios, convergence and divergence, thereby providing theoretical justifications for the 
two conflicting views of the world.  More importantly, which of these two alternative scenarios will 
materialize depends on a few key parameters in an interesting way.  The present model thus serves as 
an organizing principle on these controversial and seemingly intractable issues. 
  Before proceeding, mention should be made of the title.  The term, “financial market 
globalization” is chosen instead of “capital mobility” to emphasize two points.  First, the perspective 
adopted in this paper is global.  We are not so much interested in the effects of capital mobility on poor 
countries, but in the effects of the international financial market on the cross-country pattern of 
development in the world economy.  And, as will be discussed later, the global perspective offers 
different policy implications.  Second, the paper is concerned with the effect of international mobility of Endogenous Inequality, 7/20/00, 8:46 AM 
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financial capital, or the possibility of international lending and borrowing, which is modeled as 
intertemporal trade in the final good.  Throughout the paper, it is assumed that physical capital, i.e., the 
capital good used in the production of the final good, is nontradeable.
3  The use of the term, “capital 
mobility,” is avoided, because it could mean, to many, the tradeability of the capital good.
4 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 develops the building blocks of the 
model.  The three alternative environments, --autarky, a small open economy, and the world economy--
, are examined in sections 3, 4, and 5, respectively.  Section 6 considers an extension that allows for 
heterogeneous agents.  Section 7 discusses the related work in the literature.  Section 8 concludes.  
 
2. The Model 
  The model comes in three versions: the autarky, the small open economy, and the world 
economy consisting of a continuum of inherently identical economies.  This section explains the common 
elements. 
  Time is discrete and extends from zero to infinity (t = 0, 1, 2, ...).  There are two goods, a final 
good and physical capital, and one primary factor of production, labor.  The final good produced in 
period t may be consumed in period t or may be invested in the production of physical capital, which 
become available in period t+1.  The technology of the final goods sector is given by a linear 
homogeneous production function, Yt = F(Kt,Lt), where Kt and Lt are aggregate domestic supplies of 
physical capital and labor in period t.  (Both factors of production, physical capital and labor, are 
assumed to be immobile across countries.  Only the final good can be traded.)   Let yt  ”Yt/Lt = 
F(Kt/Lt,1) ” f(kt) where kt ” Kt/Lt  and f(k) is C
2 and satisfies f’(k) > 0 > f”(k), f(0) = 0, and f”(0) = 
¥.  The factor markets are competitive, and the factor rewards for physical capital and for labor are 
                                                                 
3 Here, the adjective “physical” is used as opposed to “financial,” not as opposed to “human.”   What truly matters 
in the following analysis is that some accumulable forms of factor inputs have nontradeable components.  Human 
capital could equally play the same role, and hence “physical capital” may be broadly interpreted to include human 
capital as well. 
4 The distinction between the international mobility of financial capital and the tradeability of the capital good would 
not be important if the credit market were perfect.  In a world of the perfect credit market, nontradeable capital goods 
would become effectively tradeable with the access to the international financial market, because the economy could 
finance the production of the nontradeable capital good by borrowing from abroad.  This distinction is critical, 
however, when the credit market is imperfect. Endogenous Inequality, 7/20/00, 8:46 AM 
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equal to rt = f’(kt) and wt = f(kt) - ktf’(kt) ” W(kt), which are both paid in the final good.  For 
simplicity, physical capital is assumed to depreciate fully in one period.  
  There are overlapping generations of two-period lived agents.  Each generation consists a 
continuum of homogenous agents with unit mass.  Each agent supplies one unit of labor inelastically to 
the final goods sector only in the first period, and consumes only in the second.
5  Thus, Lt = 1, and the 
wage income, wt, is also equal to the level of wealth held by the young agents at the end of period t.  
They allocate their wealth, wt, in order to finance their consumption in period t+1.  They have two 
options.  First, they may lend it in the competitive credit market, which earns the gross return equal to 
rt+1 per unit.  If they lend the entire wealth, their second-period consumption is equal to rt+1wt.  Second, 
they may become an entrepreneur and start a project.  The project comes in discrete, nondivisible units 
and each young agent can manage only one project.   It transforms one unit of the final good in period t 
into R > 0 units of physical capital in period t+1. 
  In what follows, it is assumed 
 
(A1)  W(R) < 1 
 
or equivalently R ˛ (0,R
+), where R
+ is defined by W(R
+) = 1.  As seen later, (A1) ensures that wt  < 
1, so that the agent needs to borrow 1-wt  > 0 in the competitive credit market, in order to start the 
project.  The second period consumption, if the agent starts the project, is equal to rt+1R-rt+1 (1-wt).  
This is greater than or equal to rt+1wt (the second period consumption if the agent lends the entire wage 
income) when the net present discounted value of the project, rt+1R/rt+1 - 1, is nonnegative.  This 
condition can be expressed as  
 
(1)  Rf’(kt+1) ‡ rt+1. 
 
                                                                 
5 It is straightforward to allow the agent to work also in the second period.  Such an extension would be desirable if 
we want to interpret physical capital more broadly to include human capital.  Endogenous Inequality, 7/20/00, 8:46 AM 
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The young agents are willing to borrow and to start the project, when (1) holds.  We shall call (1) the 
profitability constraint. 
  The credit market is competitive in the sense that both lenders and borrowers take the 
equilibrium rate, rt+1, given.  It is not competitive, however, in the sense that one cannot borrow any 
amount at the equilibrium rate.  The borrowing limit exists because of the enforcement problem: the 
payment is made only when it is the borrower’s interest to do so.  More specifically, after having 
borrowed 1-wt, and the project being completed, the entrepreneur would refuse to honor its payment 
obligation, rt+1(1-wt), if it is greater than the cost of default, which is taken to be a fraction of the project 
revenue, lrt+1R.
6  Knowing this, the lender would allow the entrepreneur to borrow only up to 
lrt+1R/rt+1.  Thus, the agent can start the project only if 1-wt £ lrt+1R/rt+1, or 
 
(2)  lRf’(kt+1) ‡ rt+1(1-W(kt)). 
 
We shall call (2) the borrowing constraint.  The parameter, 0 < l £ 1, can be naturally taken to be 
the degree of the efficiency of the credit market.  Note that there is no default in equilibrium.  It is the 
possibility of default that makes the credit market imperfect.  It should also be noted that the same 
enforcement problem rules out the possibility that different agents may pool their wealth to overcome the 
borrowing constraint. 
  In order for the young agents in period t to start the project, both the profitability constraint (1) 
and the borrowing constraint (2) must be satisfied.  In other words, they must be both willing and able 
to borrow.   These constraints can be summarized as  
 
       (rt+1/f’(kt+1))(1-W(kt ))/l  if kt < K(l), 
(3)  R ‡ Rt  ”  
      rt+1/f’(kt+1)      if kt  ‡ K(l),  
 Endogenous Inequality, 7/20/00, 8:46 AM 
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where Rt may be interpreted as the project productivity required in order for the project to be 
undertaken in period t, and K(l) is defined implicitly by W(K(l)) = 1-l.  Note that which of the two 
constraints is binding depends entirely on kt.  The borrowing constraint (2) is binding if kt < K(l); the 
profitability constraint (1) is binding if kt > K(l).  The critical value of k, which separates these two 
regimes, K(l), is decreasing in l, and satisfies K(0) = R
+, and K(1) = 0. 
 
3. The Autarky Case. 
  In autarky, there is no possibility of intertemporal trade in the final good with the rest of the 
world, which precludes international lending and borrowing.  Thus, the domestic investment (by the 
young) must be equal to the domestic saving (by the young) in equilibrium.
7  This condition is illustrated 
in Figure 1.  The domestic saving is equal to W(kt), given by the vertical line.  The domestic investment 
is equal to zero if Rt > R, and to one, if Rt < R.  If kt < R, (A1) implies that the equilibrium holds at the 
horizontal segment of the investment schedule, where Rt = R.  In equilibrium, the aggregate investment is 
made equal to W(kt).  Thus, the fraction of the young agents who become borrowers/entrepreneurs is 
equal to W(kt), while the rest, 1-W(kt), become lenders.  If kt ‡ K(l), the young agents are indifferent 
between borrowing and lending.  When kt < K(l), on the other hand, they strictly prefer borrowing to 
lending.  Therefore, the equilibrium allocation necessarily involves credit rationing, where the fraction 
1-W(kt) of the young agents are denied the credit.  Those who are denied the credit cannot entice the 
potential lenders by raising the interest rate, because the lenders would know that the borrowers would 
default at a higher rate.  (In the present model, credit rationing is an inevitable feature of the equilibrium 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
6A natural interpretation of the cost is that the creditor seizes a fraction l of the project revenue in the event of 
default. One may also interpret that this fraction of the revenue will be dissipated in the borrower’s attempt to default.  
This makes no difference, because the default does not occur in equilibrium. 
7 The GNP accounting of a closed economy, of course, implies that the saving by all the residents is equal to the 
investment by all the residents, including not only the young but also the old.  However, in this model, the old is 
never engaged in the investment activity and the old consumes all their income, so that their saving is zero.  Hence, 
the equality of the saving and the investment by the young is indeed the equilibrium condition when the economy is 
in autarky.  In what follows, we shall simply call the domestic saving and the domestic investment, without 
specifically mentioning “by the young.” Endogenous Inequality, 7/20/00, 8:46 AM 
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whenever the borrowing constraint is binding.  As will be explained in section 6, however, what is 
essential is the borrowing constraint, not credit rationing.
8) 
  Therefore, regardless of kt < K(l) or kt ‡ K(l), the measure of the young agents who start the 
project is equal to W(kt).  Since every one of them produces R units of capital in period t+1, 
 
(4)  kt+1 = RW(kt). 
 
Eq. (4) completely describes the dynamics of capital formation.  Note that, if kt < R, kt+1 = RW(kt) < 
RW(R) < R.  Therefore, k0 < R implies kt < R and wt = W(kt) < 1 for all t > 0, as has been assumed. 
  Notably, the dynamics of k, (4), is entirely independent of l; the credit market imperfection has 
no effect on the capital formation in the autarky case.  The borrowing constraint, which is binding at the 
lower level of economic development, kt < K(l), creates the gap between the return to investment and 
the opportunity cost of capital, Rf’(kt+1) > rt+1.  In autarky, the former is determined by the domestic 
saving, so that the effect of the imperfection appears entirely on the interest rate.  From (3), (4), and R = 
Rt , the equilibrium interest rate is  
 
      lRf’(RW(kt))/(1-W(kt)) < Rf’(RW(kt))    if   kt < K(l),  
(5)  rt+1 = 
      Rf’(RW(kt))            if   kt ‡ K(l). 
 
Note that a greater imperfection in the credit market (a smaller l) manifests itself in the reduction of the 
interest rate. 
  Clearly, the result that the dynamics of capital formation in autarky is unaffected by the credit 
market imperfection is not a robust feature of the model.  In particular, it critically depends on the fact 
                                                                 
8 While some authors use the term, “credit-rationing,” whenever some credit limits exist, here it is used to describe the 
situation that the aggregate supply of credit falls short of the aggregate demand, so that some borrowers cannot 
borrow up to their credit limit.  In other words, there is no credit rationing if every borrower can borrow up to its limit.  
In such a situation, their borrowing may be constraint by their wealth, which affects the credit limit, but not because 
they are credit-rationed. This is consistent with the following definition of credit rationing by Freixas and Rochet Endogenous Inequality, 7/20/00, 8:46 AM 
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that the supply of the domestic saving is inelastic.  Nevertheless, this feature of the model makes the 
autarky case a useful benchmark for examining the effects of financial market globalization in the 
presence of the imperfection. 
  The dynamics of capital formation in autarky, given by eq. (4), even though it is independent of 
l and unaffected by credit markets imperfection, may still have multiple steady states.  It is well-known 
(see, e.g. Azariadis 1993) that the overlapping agents model imposes less restrictions on the equilibrium 
dynamics than the infinitely-lived representative agent model.  This is a nuisance that has nothing to do 
with the credit market imperfection. To avoid any unnecessary complications that arise from this feature 
of overlapping generations model, we impose the following assumption: 
 
(A2)  W’(0) = ¥ and W”(k) < 0. 
 
Many standard production functions imply (A2).  For example, if y = f(k) = A(k)
a  with 0 < a < 1, 
W(k) = (1-a)A(k)
a, which satisfies (A2). 
  Under (A2), for any R ˛ (0,R
+), eq. (4) has the unique steady state, k* = K*(R) ˛ (0,R), 
defined implicitly by k* = RW(k*), and for k0 ˛ (0,R), kt converges monotonically to k* = K*(R), as 
shown in Figure 2a.  The function, K*(R), is increasing and satisfies K*(0) = 0 and K*(R
+) = R
+.   It is 
worth emphasizing that K*(R), the steady state level of k, is independent of l, and K(l), the critical 
level of k, below which the borrowing constraint is binding, is independent of R.  Therefore, the 
borrowing constraint may or may not be binding in the steady state. 
  To summarize, 
 
Proposition 1.  In autarky, the dynamics of k is given by kt+1 = RW(kt), which is independent of l, and 
converges monotonically to the unique steady state, K*(R), where K*(R) is increasing in R and satisfies 
K*(0) = 0 and K*(R
+) = R
+.  If K*(R) < K(l), the borrowing constraint is binding in the steady state.  
If K*(R) > K(l), the profitability constraint is binding in the steady state. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
(1997, Ch.5), who attributed it to Baltensperger: “some borrower’s demand for credit is turned down, even if this 
borrower is willing to pay all the price and nonprice elements of the loan contract.” Endogenous Inequality, 7/20/00, 8:46 AM 
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Figures 2a and Figure 2b illustrate Proposition 1.  The downward-sloping curve in Figure 2b is given by 
K*(R) = K(l), which connects (l,R) = (0,R
+) and (l,R) = (1,0). 
 
4. Financial Market Globalization: The Small Open Economy 
  The goal of this section is twofold.  First, it examines the effect of financial market globalization 
on the capital formation of the small open economy.  Second, it offers a preliminary step for the analysis 
of the world economy in the presence of the international financial market. 
  The agents in the small open economy are allowed to trade intertemporally the final good with 
the rest of the world at exogenously given prices.  In other words, international lending and borrowing is 
allowed.  The interest rate, the intertemporal price of the final good, is exogenously given in the 
international financial market and assumed to be invariant over time: rt+1 = r. 
  In what follows, we will focus on the case Rf’(R) < r for the ease of exposition.
9 Then, the 
equilibrium is given by Rt = R and from (3), Rf’(kt+1) = r(1-W(kt ))/l,  if kt < K(l), and Rf’(kt+1) =  r  
if kt ‡ K(l).  This can be further rewritten as 
 
        F(r(1-W(kt))/lR)     if kt < K(l), 
(6)  kt+1 = Y(kt) ” 
        F(r/R)       if kt ‡ K(l), 
 
where F is the inverse of f’, which is a decreasing function and satisfies F(¥) = 0. 
  Eq. (6) governs the dynamics of the small open economy.  Unlike in the autarky case, the 
domestic investment is no longer equal to the domestic saving. Instead, the investment is determined 
entirely by the profitability and borrowing constraints. If the credit market were perfect (l = 1 and K(1) 
= 0), the economy would immediately jumps to F(r/R), from any initial condition.   In the presence of 
                                                                 
9 If Rf’(R) ‡ r, the dynamics is given by kt+1 = min{R , Y(kt)}, where Y(kt) is defined as in eq. (6).  Assuming Rf’(R) < r 
ensures kt+1 = Y(kt) < R, and hence the equilibrium is never at the corner.  This restriction helps to reduce the 
notational burden significantly, but the result can be easily extended to the case where Rf’(R) ‡ r as well.  This Endogenous Inequality, 7/20/00, 8:46 AM 
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the imperfection, this occurs only when the economy is at the higher level of development (kt ‡ K(l)), 
where the profitability of the project is the only binding constraint.  At the lower level of development (kt 
< K(l)), the borrowing constraint is binding, which creates the gap between the return to investment 
and the interest rate.  In this range, kt+1 is increasing in lR/r and in kt.  In the autarky case, the 
investment was determined by the saving, so that a greater imperfection reduced the equilibrium interest 
rate.  In the small open economy case, on the other hand, the interest rate is given exogenously in the 
international financial market.  Therefore, a greater imperfection has the effect of reducing the domestic 
investment (and channeling more of the domestic saving into investment abroad).  A higher level of the 
capital stock in one period leads to a higher level of the capital stock in the next, because the higher 
wage income/wealth level of the young agents alleviate their borrowing constraint. 
  The steady states of the small open economy are given by the fixed points of the map (6), 
satisfying k = Y(k).  The following lemma summarizes some properties of the set of the fixed points.  




a) Eq. (6) has at least one steady state.  
b) Eq. (6) has at most one steady state above K(l).  If it exists, it is stable and equal to F(r/R). 
c) Eq. (6) has at most two steady states below K(l).  If there is only one, kL, either it satisfies 0 < kL < 
lR/r and is stable, or, kL = lR/r at which Y is tangent to the 45￿ line.  If there are two, kL and kM, they 
satisfy 0 < kL < lR/r < kM < K(l), and kL is stable and kM is unstable.      
Proof.  See Appendix. 
 
One immediate implication of Lemma is that there are only three generic cases of the dynamics 
generated by (6).  They are illustrated in Figures 3a-3c.  In Figure 3a, the unique fixed point, kL, is 
located below K(l), to which kt converges from any k0 ˛ (0,R).  In Figure 3c, the unique fixed point, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
restriction can alternatively be justified on the ground that, in the world economy version of the model developed 
later, the world interest rate prevailing in any steady state satisfies Rf’(R) < r. Endogenous Inequality, 7/20/00, 8:46 AM 
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kH = F(r/R), is located above K(l), to which kt converges from any k0 ˛ (0,R).  In Figure 3b, there 
are three fixed points; two stable steady states, kL and kH, are separated by the third (unstable) steady 
state, kM, which is located between kL and K(l), and kt converges to kL if k0 < kM and to kH if k0 > kM.  
  The following proposition provides the exact condition for each of the three cases. 
 
Proposition 2.   Let lc ˛ (0,1) be defined by f(K(lc)) = 1.  Then, 
a)  If Rf’(K(l)) < r, there exists a unique steady state, kL.  It is stable and satisfies kL < K(l). 
b)   If Rf’(K(l)) > r, f(lR/r) < 1, and l < lc, there exist three steady states, kL, kM, and kH.  They 
satisfy kL < kM < K(l) < kH, and kL and kH are stable and kM is unstable. 
c)  If Rf’(K(l)) > r  and either f(lR/r) > 1 or l > lc, there exists a unique steady state, kH.  It is 
stable and satisfies kH > K(l). 
Proof.  See Appendix. 
 
Proposition 2 is also illustrated by Figure 4.  The conditions for Proposition 2a), 2b) and 2c) are 
satisfied in Region A, B, and C, respectively.  The outer limit of Region A is given by Rf’(K(l)) = r, and 
the border between Regions B and C are given by f(lR/r) = 1.  These two downward-sloping curves 
meet tangentially at l = lc. 
  Proposition 2 states that the dynamics of capital formation in the small open economy differ 
drastically from the autarky case.  The difference is most significant when the world interest rate is such 
that the parameters lie in Region B, as illustrated by point P in Figure 4.  In this case, an integration of 
this economy to the international financial market creates multiple steady states, as shown in Figure 3b.  
If the integration occurs at the lower stage of development (kt < kM), the economy will gravitate toward 
the lower stable steady state, kL, in which the borrowing constraint is binding.  On the other hand, if the 
integration takes place at the higher level (kt > kM), the economy converges to the higher stable steady 
state, kH, in which the borrowing constraint is no longer binding.  This case thus suggests that the timing 
of the integration has significant permanent effects on the capital formation. Endogenous Inequality, 7/20/00, 8:46 AM 
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  This does not mean, however, that the integration would have negligible effects on the capital 
formation in other cases.   For example, suppose that the world interest rate is such that the parameters 
lie in Region C.  In this case, the economy will eventually converge to the unique steady state, in which 
the borrowing constraint is not binding.  The convergence could take long time, however, because the 
economy must go though the “narrow corridor” between the map and the 45￿ line, as illustrated in 
Figure 3c. 
  More generally, a comparison between the shapes of the two maps, kt+1 = RW(kt) for the 
autarky case and kt+1 = Y(kt) for the small open economy case, suggests that the integration have the 
effect of slowing down the growth process of middle-income economies.  
  Let us now consider the effect of a change in the world interest rate on the capital formation of 
the small open economy.  We focus on the case, where the parameters lie in Region B, depicted by P in 
Figure 4, and the dynamics is hence illustrated by Figure 3b.  Suppose that the economy is trapped in 
kL.  A decline in the world interest rate, illustrated in Figure 4 as the vertical move from point P in 
Region B to point P’ in Region C eliminates kL and the dynamics is now illustrated by Figure 3c.  The 
decline in the interest rate thus helps the economy to escape from the trap and to start a (perhaps long 
and slow) process of growth toward kH.  Furthermore, even a temporary decline in the interest rate 
could have similar long run effects.  Once the economy accumulates enough capital, the economy will 
not fall back to the trap, when the interest rate returns to the original level.  Therefore, even a small, 
temporary decline in the interest rate could have a significant permanent effect.
10  Similarly, one could 
show that even a small, temporary rise in the world interest rate could lead to a permanent stagnation of 
the economy, if it is initially located at kH in Figure 3b. 
  One might be tempted to argue that Region B of Figure 4, which gives rise to the dynamics 
illustrated in Figure 3b with multiple stable steady states, can be used to explain the divergence (or the 
lack of convergence) of economic performance across the countries.  Imagine that there are two small 
open countries, called N and S, which share the same technology, the same demographic structure, etc.  
Furthermore, both countries are fully integrated into the international financial market and face the same Endogenous Inequality, 7/20/00, 8:46 AM 
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world interest rate.  The only difference is that the capital stock in N is equal to kH and the capital stock 
in S is equal to kL.  The model does explain why this situation can persist, because both kH and kL are 
stable steady states of the dynamics, if the parameters lie in Region B of Figure 4. 
  While suggestive, this argument explains only the possibility that we may not observe the 
convergence of the two otherwise identical countries, but does not predict the inevitability of the 
divergence.   This is because the model also allows for the possibility of convergence.  Indeed, the 
situation in which the capital stocks are both equal to kH in N and S, and the situation in which they are 
both equal to kL in N and S, (as well as the situation in which it is equal to kH in S and kL in N) are also 
stable steady states under the same condition.  The argument does not offer any reason why one should 
believe that the divergence is a more plausible outcome than the convergence.  In other words, the small 
open economy version of the model cannot impose any restriction on the degree of inequality that might 
be observed in the world economy.  It therefore fails to predict the divergence, or the empirical finding 
reported in Quah (1993, 1997) that the distribution of the per capita income tends to converge to a 
bimodal, or “twin-peaked,” distribution in the long run. The small open economy version of the model 
imposes no restriction on the cross-country difference because it takes into account no interaction 
between the dynamics of different countries.
11 
  To resolve this problem, therefore, one must move beyond the small open economy framework, 
and analyze the model from a global perspective.  In the next section, the world economy version of the 
model is analyzed.  This helps not only to endogenize the world interest rate, but also to address the 
issue of divergence versus convergence in a more satisfactory manner. 
  Analyzing the model from a global perspective is also important for the policy analysis.  From 
the prospective of an individual country, escaping from the poverty trap may appear simple.  One might 
be tempted to argue that the poor countries should temporarily cut their financial links or that foreign 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
10Of course, how small the decline can be in order to have the permanent effect depends on the distance between 
point P and the border between Regions B and Region C.  Furthermore, the larger the decline, the shorter it can be to 
have the permanent effect. 
11 This drawback is not limited to the use of small open economy models with multiple steady states.  Any attempt to 
explain the divergence by using closed economy models with multiple steady states, like those in Azariadis and 
Drazen (1990), Ciccone and Matsuyama (1996) and others, may be criticized on the same ground. Endogenous Inequality, 7/20/00, 8:46 AM 
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aids from the rich countries should solve the problem.  The global perspective will show, however, why 
these measures may not be able to eliminate the poverty trap. 
 
5. Financial Market Globalization: The World Economy 
  In the world economy version of the model, there is a continuum of inherently identical countries 
with unit mass.  In the absence of the international financial market, this is merely a collection of the 
autarky economies analyzed in section 3.  Hence one can immediately conclude that the world economy 
would converge to the symmetric steady state, in which each country holds K*(R) units of the capital 
stock. 
  In what follows, let us assume that all the countries are fully integrated in the international 
financial market, where each country faces the same interest rate.  The world economy hence can be 
viewed as a collection of inherently identical small open economies of the type analyzed in section 4.  
Since the world as a whole is a closed economy, the interest rate is now endogenously determined to 
equate the world saving and the world investment. 
  The presence of the international financial market does not change the fact that the state in which 
every country has the capital stock equal to K*(R) is a steady state.  However, it may change the 
stability property of the symmetric steady state, in which case the world economy cannot be expected 
to converge to it in the long run.  Furthermore, it may create other steady states.  What we need to do is 
to characterize the entire set of stable steady states of the world economy. 
  In any stable steady state of the world economy, each country must be at a stable steady state 
of the small open economy.  As stated in Lemma, there are at most two stable steady states in which 
each small open economy can be located.  This means that a stable steady state of the world economy 
must be one of the following two types.  The first type is the case of perfect equality, or the case of 
convergence.  In such a steady state, all the countries have the same level of capital, k*.  The second 
type is the case of endogenous inequality, or the case of divergence.  In such a steady state, the world 
economy is polarized into the rich and the poor, in which the poor (rich) countries have the same level of Endogenous Inequality, 7/20/00, 8:46 AM 
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capital stock, given by kL (kH), which satisfies kL < K(l) <  kH.  Let us derive the condition for the 
existence of these two types of stable steady states. 
 
5.1.  The Steady State with Equality of Nations: The Case of Convergence. 
  Suppose that all the countries have the same level of capital stock, k*, in a steady state.  Then, 
the world saving is equal to W(k*).  Since the world economy as a whole is closed, the measure of the 
young agents that invest in this steady state must be equal to W(k*).  Since every one of them produces 
R units of capital, the steady state capital must satisfy k* = RW(k*), or equivalently, k* = K*(R).  If k* 
= K*(R) > K(l), the borrowing constraint is not binding, hence the world interest rate in this steady 
state is r = Rf’(K*(R)) < Rf’(K(l)).  This inequality can be rewritten as F(r/R) > K(l), which is exactly 
the condition under which a small open economy has a stable steady state, kH = F(r/R) = K*(R) = k*.  
(See also Proposition 2b)-2c).)  This proves that K*(R) > K(l) is the condition under which there 
exists a stable steady state in which all the countries have the same level of capital stock, k* = K*(R) > 
K(l). 
  If k* = K*(R) < K(l), the borrowing constraint is binding, hence the world interest rate in this 
steady state is r = lRf’(K*(R))/[1-W(K*(R))].  From c) of Lemma, k* = K*(R) < K(l) is a stable 
steady state for  each small open economy, if and only if it satisfies k* = K*(R) < lR/r = 
[1-W(K*(R))]/f’(K*(R)).  This condition can be rewritten to K*(R)f’(K*(R)) + W(K*(R)) = f(K*(R)) 
< 1.  This proves that K*(R) < K(l) and f(K*(R)) < 1 are the condition under which there exists a 
stable steady state in which all the countries have the same level of capital stock, k* = K*(R) < K(l). 
  The above argument also shows that, if K*(R) < K(l) and f(K*(R)) > 1, a symmetric  steady 
state, in which all the countries have the same level of capital stock, is unstable.   To see this, in such a 
steady state, the capital stock in each country must be equal to k* = K*(R) < K(l), which means that 
the borrowing constraint is binding.  Therefore, the world interest rate is equal to r = 
lRf’(K*(R))/[1-W(K*(R))].  When f(K*(R)) > 1, this implies k* = K*(R) > lR/r, which means that 
k* = kM from Lemma c).  Thus, it is unstable.  Figure 5 illustrates this situation.  Suppose that there is no 
international financial market at the beginning.  Then, the dynamics of every country follows kt+1 = Endogenous Inequality, 7/20/00, 8:46 AM 
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RW(kt), which converges to K*(R).  In this steady state, the interest rates are equal across countries, 
even though there is no international lending and borrowing.  If the international financial market is open 
at this point, the dynamics of each country is now governed by kt+1 = Y(kt), which cut the 45￿ line from 
below at K*(R).  This situation is unstable, even though it is still a steady state.  With occasional 
disturbances, the world economy will move away from it.  
  To summarize the above, 
 
Proposition 3.  Let Rc ˛ (0,R
+) be defined by f(K*(Rc)) = 1.  Then, 
a)  If K*(R) < K(l) and R < Rc, the state in which all the countries have k* = K*(R), is a stable 
steady state of the world economy. 
b)  If K*(R) < K(l) and R > Rc, there exists no stable steady state in which all the countries have 
the same level of capital stock. 
c)  If K*(R) > K(l), the state in which all the countries have k* = K*(R), is a stable steady state of 
the world economy. 
 
Note Rc satisfies K*(Rc) = K(lc); it is well-defined in (0,R
+), since f(K*(0)) = 0 < 1 = W(R
+) < 
f(K*(R
+)) and f(K*(R)) is strictly increasing and continuous in R. 
  Figure 6 illustrates Proposition 3.   In Regions A and AB, the condition in Proposition 3a) is 
satisfied.  In Region B, the condition in Proposition 3b) is satisfied.  In Regions BC and C, the condition 
in Proposition 3c) is satisfied.  The border between Regions AB and B is given by f(K*(R)) = 1, or R = 
Rc.  The border between Regions B and BC (as well as the border between A and C) is given by 
K*(R) = K(l). 
  What happens when the condition in Proposition 3b) holds, so that the steady state with perfect 
equality is unstable?  The next subsection provides the answer. 
  
5.2.  Steady States with Endogenous Inequality of Nations: The Case of Divergence. Endogenous Inequality, 7/20/00, 8:46 AM 
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  Suppose now that the world economy is a stable steady state, in which a fraction X of the 
countries have the capital stock equal to kL < K(l), and a fraction 1-X of the countries have the capital 
stock equal to kH > K(l).  Since all the countries face the same world interest rate, kL and kH must 
satisfy Rf’(kH) =  r = lRf’(kL)/(1-W(kL)), or 
 
(7)  f’(kH) = lf’(kL)/(1-W(kL)), 
 
in addition to 
 
(8)  kL < K(l) <  kH. 
 
From Lemma b), kt = kH is a stable steady state for each small open economy.  From Lemma c), the 
stability of kt = kL requires kL < lR/r = [1-W(kL)]/f’(kL), which can be rewritten to kLf’(kL) + W(kL) = 
f(kL) < 1, or  
 
(9)  kL < K*(Rc) = K(lc). 
 
  Since the young agents in the fraction X of the countries earn W(kL) and those in the fraction 
1-X earn W(kH), the world saving is given by XW(kL) +(1-X)W(kH), which is equal to the world 
investment, which produces R units of capital per unit.  Hence, the total capital stock must satisfy  
 
(10)  XkL + (1-X)kH = XRW(kL) +(1-X)RW(kH). 
 
A stable steady state with endogenous inequality exists if there are kL and kH that solve (7)-(10). 
 
Proposition 4.    Let Rc ˛ (0,R
+) and lc ˛ (0,1) be defined by f(K*(Rc)) = f(K(lc)) = 1. The world 
economy has a continuum of stable steady states, in which a fraction X ˛ (X
- ,X
+) ￿ (0,1) of the Endogenous Inequality, 7/20/00, 8:46 AM 
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countries have the capital stock, kL < K(l), and a fraction 1- X of the countries have the capital stock 
equal to kH > K(l), if and only if l < lc, f’(K(l)) > lf’(K*(R))/[1-W(K*(R))] where R < Rc, and l < 
f’(K*(R))K(lc).   Furthermore, X
- > 0 if R > Rc and X
+ < 1 if K*(R) < K(l).  
Proof.  See Appendix. 
 
Figure 6 illustrates Proposition 4, whose condition is satisfied in Regions, AB, B, and BC.  The border 
between Regions A and AB is given by f’(K(l)) = lf’(K*(R))/[1-W(K*(R))]  with R < Rc and l < lc.  
It is upward-sloping and connecting (l,R) = (0,0) and (l,R) = (lc,Rc).  The border between Regions 
BC and C is given by f’(K*(R))K(lc) = l.  This curve is downward-sloping, and stays above K*(R) = 
K(l) for l< lc, and tangent to it at (l,R) = (lc,Rc).
12  Combined with Proposition 3, we can conclude 
the following.  In Regions A and C, there is a unique stable steady state, which is symmetric.  In both 
cases, the model predicts the convergence of economic performances across countries.  In Region A, 
the investment is borrowing-constrained in all the countries.  In Region C, the borrowing constraint is 
not binding in any country.  In Region B, there is no stable steady state with perfect equality.  Even 
though there are a continuum of stable steady states, they all show that the long-run distribution of the 
capital stock, and hence those of the income, the wage, etc, have two mass points.  In Region B, 
therefore, the co-existence of rich and poor nations is an inevitable feature of the world economy.  In 
other words, the model predicts that financial market globalization causes inequality of nations.  In 
Region AB, and Region BC, these two types of the steady states co-exist. 
  The prediction of the model is most stark when the parameters lie in Region B of Figure 6.  In 
this case, K*(R) < K(l) so that that, in autarky, each country would converge to the same steady state, 
in which the borrowing constraint is binding.  In the presence of the international financial market, the 
symmetry-breaking caused by unrestricted flows of financial capital leads to the polarization of the 
world economy into the rich and the poor.  In any such stable steady state, the rich countries accumulate 
enough capital that the borrowing constraint is no longer binding for the entrepreneurs in the rich 
                                                                 
12 To see this, let Q(l) ” f’(K(l))K(lc) - l.  Then, Q(lc) = f’(K(lc))K(lc) - lc = f’(K(lc))K(lc) -f(K(lc)) + (1 - lc) =  (1 - lc) 
-W(K(lc)) = 0, and Q’(l) ” f”(K(l))K(lc)K’(l) - 1 = K(lc)/K(l) - 1 < 0 for l < lc, since K’(l) = 1/f”(K(l))K(l) by 
differentiating W(K(l)) =  (1 - l).  Therefore, Q(l) > Q(lc) = 0 for l < lc.  Thus, l = f’(K*(R))K(lc) implies f’(K(l))K(lc) 
> l = f’(K*(R))K(lc) or K*(R) > K(l) for l < lc.  The tangency follows from  Q’(lc) = 0. Endogenous Inequality, 7/20/00, 8:46 AM 
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countries, while it is binding for those in the poor countries (kL < K(l) < kH).  Furthermore, one can 
show that, from (A2) and (10), kL < K*(R) < kH  in these steady states.  That is to say, the rich 
countries become richer and the poor become poorer than in autarky.  Therefore, this case provides a 
theoretical justification for the view that the international financial market is a mechanism through which 
rich countries become richer at the expense of poor countries.   
  When the world economy is polarized, the countries that became poor find themselves in the 
stable steady state with the binding borrowing constraint, kL in Figure 3b.  From a perspective of an 
individual country, the problems of poor countries may seem easy to solve.  It may appear that, in order 
to escape the poverty trap and to join the club of rich countries, all the government has to do is to cut its 
link to the international financial market temporarily.  The global perspective, however, offers a different 
view.  Such temporary isolationist policy cannot work if it is attempted by all the countries.  This is 
because, once the restriction is removed, a positive measure of countries must find themselves in the 
lower steady state.  (Note that, in Region B, a fraction of the countries that become poor is bounded 
away from zero.)  Similar points can be made for a joint attempt for the poor countries to cut their links 
to the rich countries and to unite among themselves.  It is impossible for all of them to escape from the 
poverty trap.  Nor would the official aids from the rich countries eliminate the inequalities.  As illustrated 
in Figure 5, one of the reasons why the symmetric steady state is unstable is that there is no enough 
world saving to finance the investment required to make all the countries rich.   As long as the 
parameters lie in Region B of Figure 6, some countries must be excluded from being rich, just as in a 
game of musical chairs. 
 
6. Heterogeneous Agents 
  In the models presented above, the agents are assumed to be homogeneous.  This assumption, 
while simplifying the analysis significantly, implies that the agents are equally willing and equally credit-
worthy as an entrepreneur.  This means that the saving and the investment can be equalized in the 
autarky case only by means of credit-rationing, when the borrowing constraint is binding.  This section 
briefly sketches a model with heterogeneous agents, and demonstrates that, even though equilibrium Endogenous Inequality, 7/20/00, 8:46 AM 
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credit rationing does not occur, much of the results obtained above carry over. This should help to 
convince the reader that what matters in the analysis is the borrowing constraint, not the presence of 
equilibrium credit rationing. 
  Let us assume that the agents are heterogeneous in terms of their productivity as an 
entrepreneur.  More specifically, R is now an agent-specific, and its cumulative distribution is given by 
G(R), without any mass point, with the density function, g(R) = G’(R) > 0.  In period t, only the young 
agents whose productivity satisfies R ‡ Rt are willing to borrow and credit-worthy.  If kt  ‡ K(l) so that 
Rt = rt+1/f’(kt+1), the agents with R < Rt are not willing to start the projects, because they are not 
profitable.  If  kt < K(l) so that Rt = rt+1(1-W(kt))/lf’(kt+1), the agents with R < Rt want to borrow but 
they are not denied credit, because they are not as credit-worthy as the agents with R ‡ Rt.  Thus, the 
domestic investment in period t is equal to 1-G(Rt), which is a well-defined function, and decreasing in 
Rt.   The capital stock in period t+1 is now given by 
 




￿  ” H(Rt), 
 
where H is decreasing in Rt with H’(Rt) = -Rtg(Rt) < 0.   
  In the autarky case, the domestic investment is equal to the domestic saving: 
 
(12)  W(kt) = 1 - G(Rt) 
 
Since the RHS is a well-defined decreasing function in Rt, eq. (12) determines Rt uniquely as a 
decreasing function of kt.   Since Rt adjusts to ensure the saving-investment balances, there is no 
equilibrium credit rationing.   The dynamics is described entirely by (11) and (12), or  
 
(13)  kt+1 = H(G
-1(1-W(kt))) ” L(kt) 
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which is independent of l.   When kt < K(l), a greater credit market imperfection reduces the interest 
rate, but not the dynamics of capital formation.  Some algebra verifies L’(kt)= RtW’(kt) = 
G
-1(1-W(kt))W’(kt) > 0, and that (A2) ensures that  L’(0) = ¥  and L”(kt) = RtW”(kt) 
-(W’(kt))
2/g(Rt) < 0.  Therefore, for any distribution G, kt converges to the unique steady state, K*(G) 
> 0.  In the steady state, the borrowing constraint is binding if and only if K*(G) < K(l). 
  In the small open economy, eq. (3) with rt+1 = r and (11) yield 
 
         r(1-W(kt ))/l,   if  kt < K(l), 
  H
-1(kt+1)f’(kt+1) = 
        r      if kt  ‡ K(l), 
 
where the LHS is strictly decreasing in kt+1.  By denoting the inverse function of H
-1(k)f’(k) by W, the 
dynamics of the small open economy is described by  
 
      W(r(1-W(kt ))/l)    if  kt < K(l), 
(14)  kt+1 =  
       W(r)        if kt  ‡ K(l), 
 
which defines a map from kt to kt+1, which is continuous, increasing in kt < K(l), and constant in kt  ‡ 
K(l).  A greater credit market imperfection reduces the rate of capital formation, when kt < K(l), but 
not when kt > K(l).  For a sufficiently high r or a sufficiently low l, W(r) < K(l) holds, and there are, 
generically speaking, m stable and m - 1 unstable steady states (m = 1, 2,...), all of which are located 
below K(l).  If W(r) > K(l), there is one and only stable steady state above K(l), in addition to the 
same number of stable and unstable steady states below K(l). 
Qualitatively, (14) differs from (6) only in that there may be additional pair of stable and unstable steady 
states below K(l).  Thus, (14) is capable of generating any qualitative feature of the dynamics 
generated by (6), which is nothing but a special case of (14). Endogenous Inequality, 7/20/00, 8:46 AM 
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  A characterization of the steady states in the world economy case is hopelessly complicated.  
This is only because that there may be more than two stable steady states of the small open economy, 
which dramatically increases the number of the types of the steady states of the world economy.  If the 
existence of m stable steady states of the small open economy cannot be ruled out, 2
m - 1 types of the 
steady states of the world economy need to be distinguished.  It should be obvious, however, that a 
sufficiently small heterogeneity, which makes H
-1(k) almost constant, would not change the nature of the 
model.  This can be verified, for example, by letting G is the uniform distribution around a fixed 
parameter, R, and making the support increasingly small. 
 
7. Related Work in the Literature. 
  Starting with Bernanke and Gertler (1989), many recent studies have examined the implications 
of imperfect credit markets on the aggregate investment behavior. The critical feature of the present 
model, --an increase in the entrepreneur’s wealth eases the borrowing constraint--, is common in this 
literature.  Many of these studies assume the presence of an alternative storage technology that helps to 
pin down the interest rate, which makes their models effectively partial equilibrium ones, as in the small 
open economy case above.  What is crucial in this paper is that the extent to which the interest rate can 
adjust endogenously changes with financial market globalization. 
  Most of these studies introduce imperfect credit markets through moral hazard, adverse 
selection, and costly state verification models. Among macroeconomic studies that introduce the 
imperfect credit markets through the threat of potential defaults are Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, Ch.6.1and Ch.6.2), and Aghion, Banerjee and Piketty (1999).  The 
specification here follows Matsuyama (forthcoming).  The main advantage of using potential defaults as 
a source of imperfection is its simplicity and tractability. 
  A large number of recent studies examine imperfect credit markets in an open economy context.  
They mostly focus on the issue of short-run volatility, motivated by recent economic crises in emerging 
markets.  Only a few studies have addressed the role of the international financial market on the cross-
country pattern of development in the presence of imperfect credit markets.  The seminal work is Endogenous Inequality, 7/20/00, 8:46 AM 
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Gertler and Rogoff (1990).  Their model is static, with the entrepreneur’s wealth being exogenous, so 
that the dynamic effect of financial market globalization cannot be addressed.  Furthermore, in the 
simple version of their model, presented in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, Ch.6.4), the credit market 
imperfection only reduces the flow of financial capital from the rich to the poor, but does not generate a 
reverse flow.  This can happen in their model only when the poor initially has sufficiently high external 
debt.  Boyd and Smith (1997) succeeded in eliminating these limitations of the Gertler-Rogoff model.  
They developed an overlapping generations model of a two-country world economy, with the imperfect 
credit market arising from a costly-state-verification problem.  However, their model is so complicated 
that they had to assume that the borrowing constraint is always binding for both countries, both in and 
out of the steady states, and even then, they had to rely on the numerical simulation to prove the stability 
of asymmetric steady states.  They also restricted their parameters in such a way the symmetric steady 
state is always unstable.  The model presented in this paper has advantage of being tractable, which 
makes it possible to characterize all the stable steady states for a full set of the parameter values, without 
making any auxiliary assumption.  In other words, the present model allows one to derive the analytical 
conditions for the stability of the symmetric and asymmetric steady states and for the borrowing 
constraint to be binding in these steady states.  This in turn makes it possible to examine the effects of 
changing the parameter values, making the model useful as an intuition-building device on the issue of 
convergence versus divergence.  Furthermore, the analysis have shown that the rich are not borrowing-
constrained and the poor remain borrowing-constrained in all asymmetric stable steady states, which 
exist whenever the symmetric steady state is unstable. 
  Matsuyama (forthcoming) also developed a model of endogenous inequality based on credit 
market imperfections that arise from the potential risk of defaults.  The model differs from the present 
one in two crucial respects.  First, it is a closed economy model.  Second, its intertemporal transmission 
mechanism operates through bequests.  These features played useful roles for addressing the issue of 
inequality across households within an economy.  In the present model, the agents have no bequest 
motives and intertemporal transmission operates through nontraded factor markets, which helps to focus 
on the issue of inequality across nations. Endogenous Inequality, 7/20/00, 8:46 AM 
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  The present paper is concerned with globalization of financial markets.  Some studies 
considered the effects of globalization in goods markets on the pattern of economic development.  
Matsuyama (1991) showed that the properties of an endogenous growth could change drastically  in the 
presence of the world trade.  Both Krugman and Venables (1995) and Matsuyama (1996) have shown, 
in static models of the world economy that consists of identical economies, that the symmetry-breaking 
caused by international trade leads to a polarization of the world economy into the rich and the poor.
13  
In these models, however, the countries that become poorer than others may or may not be poorer than 
in autarky.  In contrast, the poor countries are always poorer than in autarky in the present model. 
 
8.  Concluding Remarks 
  This paper analyzed the effects of financial market globalization on the cross-country pattern of 
development in the world economy.  To this end, it developed a dynamic macroeconomic model of 
imperfect credit markets, in which the investment becomes borrowing-constrained at the lower stage of 
development.  In the absence of the international financial market, the world economy converges to the 
symmetric steady state, and the cross-country difference disappears in the long run. In the presence of 
the international financial market, the symmetric steady state could lose its stability, in which case the 
cross-country distribution of the capital stocks is concentrated into two mass points in all the stable 
steady states.  The symmetry-breaking caused by unrestricted flows of financial capital leads to a 
polarization of the world economy into the rich and the poor.  The model thus demonstrates the 
possibility that financial market globalization may cause, or at least magnify, inequality of nations, and the 
international financial market is a mechanism through which some countries become rich at the expense 
of others.  At the same time, the model also suggests that poor countries cannot jointly escape from the 
poverty trap by merely cutting their links to rich countries. 
  Needless to say, the model presented is highly stylized, and can be extended in a number of 
ways.  Let us suggest four extensions that seem particularly important. 
  First, in the analysis above, the effects of financial market globalization were examined by 
comparing the two extreme cases, autarky and full financial market integration.  It would be more 
                                                                 
13 As the reader might have noticed, the title of this paper was inspired by that of Krugman and Venables (1995). Endogenous Inequality, 7/20/00, 8:46 AM 
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satisfactory to introduce some parameters that may be interpreted as a measure of financial market 
globalization.  Any empirical assessment of the impacts of the international financial market on the cross-
country pattern of development would require such an extension. 
  Second, the model assumes that globalization has no effect on the penalty for defaults, and 
hence the efficiency of the credit markets.  This assumption may be justified as a benchmark case, 
because it is not obvious in which direction globalization might affect the operation of credit markets.
14  
Yet, the reader should keep in mind that the results of this paper is conditional on this assumption.  At 
the same time, it is highly desirable to combine the present macroeconomic model with a variety of 
microeconomics of credit markets in such a way that one could examine full impacts of globalization of 
financial markets. 
  Third, the model assumes that the project started by an agent produces the capital good that 
can be used only in his/her country.  This assumption seems reasonable when the capital good is 
interpreted as a form of human capital.  For the physical capital good, this assumption may be too 
restrictive.  If starting a project in a foreign country is possible (with some costs), the agents in rich 
countries have an incentive to a project in poor countries, where the rental rate of capital is high.  Such 
an extension would be useful for examining the effects of foreign direct investment. 
  Fourth, the model does not allow for sustainable growth of the world economy as a whole.  It 
would be interesting to examine the condition under which endogenous inequality of nations occurs in a 
growing global economy.  This would require the model to be extended in such a way that the minimum 
requirement for the project investment would increase with the growth of the world economy. 
  It is hoped that the model presented in this paper serves as a useful first step toward these 
extensions. 
                                                                 
14 On one hand, one might argue that, the lower the cost of international financial transactions is, the harder it 
becomes to catch the borrowers that defaulted.  If so, globalization has the effect of reducing the efficiency of credit 
markets.  On the other hand, one might also argue that the globalization and resulting competition for the world 
saving provide a greater incentive for an individual country to improve legal and other protections for both domestic 
and foreign creditors.  If so, globalization has the effect of enhancing the efficiency of credit markets. Endogenous Inequality, 7/20/00, 8:46 AM 
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Appendix 
Proof of Lemma. 
a)  This follows from that Y is a continuous map on [0,R] into itself.   
b)  This is trivial, because the map, Y, is constant above K(l) and equal to F(r/R).   
c)  Differentiating (6) yields Y’(kt) = kt[f”(kt )/f”(Y(kt))](r/lR) for kt < K(l).  By setting kt = 
Y(kt) = k, the slope of the map at a steady state, k < K(l), is equal to Y’(k) = k(r/lR), which is 
increasing in k.  Also, Y(0) =  F(r/lR) > 0.  Therefore, at the smallest steady state, 0 < kL < K(l), if 
there is one, either Y is tangent to the 45￿ line (i.e., Y’(kL) = kL(r/lR) = 1 or kL = lR/r), in which case 
it is the only intersection below K(l), or Y cuts the 45￿ line from above (i.e., Y’(kL) = kL(r/lR) < 1 or 
kL < lR/r), in which case it is stable.  At the second smallest steady state, kM, if it exists, Y cuts the 45￿ 
line from below (i.e., Y’(kM) = kM(r/lR) > 1, or  kM > lR/r) and hence it is unstable, which also implies 
that Y cannot cut the 45￿ line from above between kM  and K(l), ruling out the existence of a third 
steady state below K(l).  This completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 2.  
The proof consists of four steps. 
Step 1.  Since f(K(l)) is strictly decreasing and continuous in l and f(K(1)) = f(0) = 0 < 1 = W(R
+) < 
f(R
+) = f(K(0)), lc ˛ (0,1) is well-defined and f(K(l)) > (<) 1 if and only if l <(>) lc.  
Step 2.  Consider the nongeneric case of Rf’(K(l)) = r.  Then, K(l) = F(r/R) and hence K(l) is a 
fixed point of the map, Y.  Because f(K(l)) -1 = K(l)f’(K(l)) + W(K(l)) -1 = K(l)r/R -l = 
l[limk›K(l)Y’(k) -1], the left derivative of the map at K(l) is greater (less) than one if and only if 
f(K(l)) > (<) 1 or l  <(>) lc.  These properties are illustrated in Figure A1 for l  < lc and Figure A2 
for l  ‡ lc.  Note that, from Lemma, Y has another intersection, 0 < kL < K(l), in Figure A1, and has 
no other intersection in Figure A2.   
Step 3.  Consider the case where Rf’(K(l)) < r.  This case can be studied by reducing R, starting from 
the case, Rf’(K(l)) = r, while fixing l and r.  This change is captured by a downward shift of the map, 
Y, in Figures A1 and A2.  Clearly, with any downward shift, Y has the unique stable fixed point, which 
satisfies kL < K(l).  This proves Proposition 2a). Endogenous Inequality, 7/20/00, 8:46 AM 
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Step 4.  Consider the case where Rf’(K(l)) > r, which can be studied by increasing R, starting from the 
case, Rf’(K(l)) = r, while fixing l and r.  This change is captured by a upward shift of the map Y in 
Figures A1 and A2.  In Figure A2, i.e., if f(K(l)) £ 1, Y has the stable unique fixed point, kH = F(r/R) 
> K(l), after any upward shift.  In Figure A1, i.e., if f(K(l)) > 1, there is a critical value of R, R’, such 
that, if r/f’(K(l)) < R < R’, there are three fixed points, kL < kM < K(l) < kH, and, if R > R’, there is 
the unique fixed point, kH = F(r/R) > K(l).  In the borderline case, R = R’, Y is tangent to the 45￿ line 
below K(l).  From Lemma c), the value of k at the tangency is equal to lR’/r, and hence Y(lR’/r) = 
lR’/r, which can be rewritten as (lR’/r)f’(lR’/r) = 1-W(lR’/r), or f(lR’/r) = 1.  Thus, f(lR/r) < 1 
implies the three fixed points and f(lR/r) > 1 implies the unique steady state, kH = F(r/R) > K(l).  This 
proves Proposition 2b) and 2c). 
Proof of Proposition 4. 
  First, note that (7) defines kH as a function of kL.  Differentiating (7) shows that this function, 
denoted by kH = f(kL), is increasing if and only if f(kL) < 1 or equivalently kL < K*(Rc) = K(lc).  
Furthermore, it satisfies f(0) = 0 and f(K(l)) = K(l).  If l ‡ lc, K(l) £ K(lc) and hence kL < K(l) 
implies kH = f(kL) <  f(K(l)) = K(l), which violates (8).  If l < lc, the set of (kL, kM) that satisfies 
(7), (8), and (9) is nonempty, and illustrated by the solid curve in Figure A3. 
  Second, (A2) and (8) imply that (10) has a solution, X ˛ (X
- , X
+) ￿ (0,1), if and only if kL < 
K*(R) < kH.  This condition is illustrated by the shaded area in Figure A3.  Therefore, a stable steady 
state, (kL, kH, X), exists if and only if the solid curve (the segment of kH = f(kL) that satisfies (8) and 
(9)), overlaps with the shaded area, or equivalently, if and only if K(l) < f(K*(R)) and f(K(lc)) = 
f(K*(Rc)) > K*(R).  The first condition can be rewritten to f’(K(l)) > lf’(K*(R))/[1-W(K*(R))] 
where R < Rc and the second to l < f’(K*(R))K(lc) = f’(K*(R))K*(Rc).  
  That X
- > 0 requires that the upper-right end of the solid curve is strictly inside the shaded area, 
or equivalently R > Rc.  Similarly, X
+ < 1 if and only if the lower-left end of the solid curve is strictly 
inside the shaded area, or equivalently, K(l) > K*(R). 
  This completes the proof. Endogenous Inequality, 7/20/00, 8:46 AM 
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